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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LAURA BETH BARKER, and
the STATE OF UTAH,
Department of Human
Services,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
Case No. 930587-CA
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER,
Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§
78-2a-3(2)(h) and 78-45-10 (1993).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The text of the following statutes and rules are contained
in the Addendum:
A.
B.
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34-34-2 (1993)
34-34-6 (1993)
62A-9-114(l) (Supp. 1994)
62A-11-106 (Supp. 1994)
62A-11-302 (1992)
62A-ll-303(3) (1992)
62A-ll-304.2(3) (Supp. 1994)
63-46b-l(2)(1) (1993)
78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1994)
78-45-7 (Supp. 1994)
78-45-9(1)(a) (Supp. 1994)
78-45-10 (1993)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Mr. Barker ("Appellant") has listed thirty-nine issues in
his brief, however, in the view of the State of Utah, Department
of Human Services ("Appellee"), a number of his enumerated issues

are either redundant or inclusive of several major issues.
Therefore, Appellee has categorized Appellant's issues under
three major issues.
1.

Whether the lower court determination of contempt of

court for Appellant's failure to pay child support and order
requiring him to immediately serve thirty days in jail for this
contempt violated provisions of the U.S. Constitution, the Utah
Constitution and/or Utah law.
Standard of Review:

This is a question of law which this

court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial
court's determination.

Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800

P.2d 1095 (Utah 1990) .
2.

Whether the lower court findings of fact are sufficient

to support its order of a judgment of child support arrearages
against Appellant.
Standard of Review:

Findings of fact shall not be set aside

unless clearly erroneous.
52(a).
3.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule

Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
Whether the lower court's order of a judgment against

Appellant for child support arrearages violates provisions of the
U.S. Constitution, the Utah Constitution and/or Utah law.
Standard of Review:

This is a question of law, which this

court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial
court's determination.

Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800

P.2d 1095 (Utah 1990) .

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A Decree of Divorce and Order of Support dated June 8, 1987
and signed by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs of the District Court of
Sanpete County, Sixth Judicial District awarded Laura Beth Barker
("Ms. McGillivray") a divorce from Appellant, awarded custody of
the parties five children to Ms. McGillivray and ordered child
support to be paid by the Appellant in the amount of $100.00 per
child.

(R.341-347).

The order further provided that the child

support obligation would increase to $150.00 per month for four
of the children for a total of $600.00, when the eldest child
reached eighteen.
1970.

(R.343).

The eldest child was born April 21,

(R.323).
Based upon the above-stated order of support, Appellee filed

with the District Court a Motion for an Order to Show Cause dated
February 3, 1993.

(R.603-604).

Pursuant to this Motion, the

District Court in an order dated February 4, 199 3, ordered
Appellee to appear and show cause in pertinent part as to the
following:

1) why judgment should not be entered against him in

the sum of $13,050.00 for unpaid child support from March 1, 1991
through January 31, 1993; 2) why he should not be required to pay
$600.00 per month ongoing child support commencing February 1,
1993; 3) why he should not be required to make all payments in
this matter to Appellee; and 4) why he should not be held in
contempt of court for failure to make child support payments as
previously ordered by the court.

(R.605-606).

On February 26, 1993, Appellant filed a Counterclaim for
3

Abuse of Process and Harassment and Petition for Change of
Circumstances.

(R.616-619).

a Petition to Modify.
substance, that:

The Court treated these filings as

(R.788 p. 8-9).l

Appellant alleged, in

1) the State had no jurisdiction over him; 2)

this matter had already been litigated by this court; 3) the
State violated his due process rights by not notifying him that
Ms. McGillivray was receiving public assistance; 4) his support
payment should be modified because of a change in circumstances;
and 5) the State was guilty of abuse of process and harassment.
(R.616-619).
The Appellee denied Appellant's allegations and asked the
court to dismiss Appellant's Petition in its Answer to
Appellant's Petition to Modify filed April 6, 1993.

(R.628-631).

Subsequently, Appellant filed three additional Petitions to
Modify in which he asserted virtually identical allegations to
those set forth in his previous petition filed February 26, 1993.
These petitions were filed on April 16, 1993 (R.634-640), May 26f
1993 (R.669-671), and June 9, 1993 (R.681-684).
The Appellee's Motion and Order to Show Cause and
Appellant's Motions were heard by the Honorable Louis G. Trevort
on June 30, 1993.

(R.788 p. 3). After the hearing, the Court

issued a bench ruling.

(R.788 p. 122-123).

The court ruled that

Appellee was entitled to a $13,050.00 judgment against Appellant
L

The lower court did not properly number the record.
Specifically, the transcript is only numbered on the cover page.
So, throughout Appellee's brief, when a citation is needed to the
transcript, we will cite R.788 for the transcript and the specific
number of the page in the transcript.
4

for unpaid child support for the period of March 1, 1991 through
January 31, 1993.

(R.788 p. 122-123).

The court dismissed

Appellant's Petition to Modify and found Appellant in contempt of
court for failure to fulfill his support obligation, thereby
ordering him to serve thirty days in the Sanpete County Jail,
beginning at the time of the hearing.

(R.788 p.122-123).

On July 16, 1993, the trial court entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.722-728) as well as its Judgment
and Order in which the court basically reiterated its bench
ruling.

(R.729-732).

Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial and Relief from
Judgment or Order on July 13, 1993, in which Appellant claimed,
in relevant part, that his due process rights were violated
because he was denied court appointed counsel.

(R.708-716).

The

Court, in a Judgment and Order entered August 19, 1993, denied
Appellant's request for court appointed counsel, request for a
new trial, and request for relief from the judgment and order.
(R.749-751).
On September 23, 1993, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal,
appealing the lower court's judgment and order entered July 16,
199 3 and its post-judgment and order entered August 19, 1993.
(R.756).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the Decree of Divorce and Order of Support dated June 8,
1987, entered by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, the court determined
that it has and retains jurisdiction over the Appellant.
5

(R.330-

331).

Specifically, the court found that the Appellant is no

different under the law than any other citizen of the State of
Utah or the United States of America that might appear before the
court.

There is no distinction of citizen by classification,

therefore the Appellant can claim no special status by reason of
special citizenship classification.

(R.723).

Furthermore,

Appellant's failure to participate in the Social Security system
is not a basis for claiming special treatment or citizenship
status.

(R.723).

The Appellant did not appeal this

determination and the time for appeal has expired.
Additionally, in the Decree of Divorce and Judgment, Judge
Tibbs ordered Appellant to pay $150.00 per month child support
per child, totalling $600.00 per month.

(R.343).

The payments

were to be made to Appellee so long as Ms. McGillivray received
public assistance.

(R.343).

Public assistance has been provided

for Appellant's minor children.

(R.788 p. 33, R.600).

Appellant

did not make any child support payments either to Appellee or Ms.
McGillivray during the period of March 1, 1991 through January
31, 1993.

(R.788 p. 33).

At the time of the Decree of Divorce, the Appellant was
capable of earning $1,500.00 per month.

(R.343, R.788 p. 29).

At the time of the June 30, 1993 hearing, appellant had a
capacity to earn in excess of $2,000.00 per month based upon his
educational training and work history.

(R.788 p. 48-49).

Appellant did not have any medical evidence to support any claim
of medical disability.

(R.788 p. 50).
6

The Appellant owes child support for the period March 1,
1991 through January 31, 1993 in the amount of $13,050.00.
(R.726).

Based upon this failure to pay child support Appellant

was immediately sentenced to thirty days in the Sanpete County
Jail.

(R.728) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Appellant makes sixteen separate arguments against the trial
court and Appellee.

For a majority of these arguments, the

cases, statutes and constitutional provisions cited by Appellant
are irrelevant and/or misinterpreted.

Furthermore, an additional

number of his arguments are totally unsound and frivolous in that
they are not based upon any evidence or authority.
Appellant has a fundamental misunderstanding of the State
child support enforcement laws and procedures.

Appellee is

statutorily authorized by law to enforce Appellant's child
support obligation and the lower court's Findings of Fact and
Order are consistent with this statutory framework.
Additionally, Appellant challenges the contempt order of the
lower court on the basis that he was entitled to legal counsel
and none was appointed to him prior to incarceration.

The

contempt order of the court was civil in nature and so the
challenge of the Appellant is without merit.
if there is merit, the issue is now moot.

7

Furthermore, even

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLEE IS STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TO DIRECTLY COLLECT
FROM AN OBLIGOR MONIES EXPENDED THROUGH PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE PROVIDED FOR DEPENDENT CHILDREN.
The points in Appellant's Brief clearly indicate that
Appellant has a fundamental misunderstanding of the State's child
support enforcement laws and procedure.
The Office of Recovery Services is statutorily authorized to
obtain and enforce child support orders in support actions.
Appellant claims that the Utah Department of Human Services
cannot be subrogated to Ms. McGillivray's rights against
Appellant on unpaid support payments.

Specifically, Appellant

asserts that since he never contracted with the Department of
Human Services, the State is illegally attempting to force him
into a welfare contract.

(Appellant's Brief at 25).

This claim by Appellant that a contract with the State is a
necessary prerequisite for the State to collect unpaid child
support is contrary to the statutory authority which enables the
Office of Recovery Services to obtain and enforce child support
orders in support action.

This is especially true when Aid to

Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") has been provided for
the children, Utah Code Ann.

§ 62A-11-106 (Supp. 1994), Utah

Code Ann. § 62A-11-304.2(3) (Supp. 1994), Utah Code Ann. § 78-459(1)(a) (Supp. 1994) provides:
The obligee may enforce his right of support
against the obligor and the office may
proceed...on behalf of the Department of
8

Human Services...to enforce the right to
recovery public assistance,..
In Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (Utah 1976), the
court held that where a divorced wife and her four children were
receiving public assistance, it was proper for the Department of
Social Services to intervene on her behalf in an action to force
her ex-husband to make unpaid child support payments.

_Id. at

241.
The policy and the law is...to simplify and
expedite procedure and to avoid multiplicity
of lawsuits. The right of children to
support and the parental duty to provide it,
supplemented by the State when necessary,
gives rise to a mutual interest in [the
problem of child support collection]...[i]t
was [therefore] appropriate for the State to
join as an intervenor in this action. Id.
If a custodial parent has received AFDC for the child, the
Office of Recovery Services has another separate, statutory
interest in status as a party in such proceedings, i.e. as an
assignee of the custodians right to child support for operation
of law through execution of an actual assignment.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-45-9(1)(a), Utah Code Ann. § 62A-ll-303(3) (1992).
Appellant also claimed that he and Appellee contracted to
allow payment in kind and therefore the State had no authority to
provide public assistance to his children in the first place,
because it "forced" him into the "welfare contract."
(Appellant's Brief at p. 25-26).

Appellant's claim, however,

rises from his misunderstanding of the purpose of the State child
support enforcement laws.

Utah Code Ann. §62A-9-114(1) (Supp.

1994) provides:
9

Aid to Families with Dependent Children may
be provided to families and children in
accordance with Title IV-A of the Social
Security Act and applicable federal
regulations.
A child who is not financially supported by his or her natural
parents is instead supported by federal and state taxpayers
through jointly funded public assistance programs such as AFDC.
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-302 (1992).
Furthermore, even if Appellant and Ms. McGillivray did agree
to such a contract, Utah Code Ann. § 6 2A-11-106(2) provides:
[n]o agreement between an obligee and an
obligor, either relieving an obligation or
purporting to settle past, present, or future
obligations either as a settlement or
prepayment, reduces or terminates the right
of the office to recover from that obligor on
the behalf of the Department for public
assistance provided...
Given the Appellee's clear authority to recover the public
assistance provided for his children, the trial court's Judgment
and Order for the Appellee is clearly based in solid statutory
authority.
The Appellant claims that the Appellee violated his due
process rights by failing to notify him that his children were
receiving public assistance.

(Appellant's Brief at p. 6-7).

Contrary to this claim, Appellee was under no duty to notify
Appellant of this situation.

Appellant cites § 63-46b-3 of the

Utah Code for this alleged duty to notify.

This provision of the

law outlines the requirement for commencement of adjudicative
proceedings for State agencies under the Administrative
Procedures Act.

Appellant's argument ignores the fact that there
10

was no adjudicative proceeding with respect to the determination
of public assistance eligibility for his children and notice of
this matter.

Furthermore, even if there was an adjudicative

proceeding this proceeding would be exempted by Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-l(2)(1) which states:
This chapter [63-46b-l et seq.] does not
govern: the initial determination of any
persons eligibility for government of public
assistance benefits.
Appellant cites no other authority for his argument.
Furthermore, generally regarding Appellant's due process
arguments, as found by the trial court, the Appellant was
afforded due process every time he was before the court.
(R.724).

Each time the State sought judgment against the

Appellant, he was given notice of the State's claim and an
opportunity to present his arguments in court.

(R.788 p. 110).

Therefore, Appellant's claim that he was denied due process is
unfounded.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT MADE SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND PROPERLY
DISMISSED APPELLANT'S PETITION TO MODIFY.
The lower court considered Appellant's Counterclaim for
Abuse of Process and Harassment and Petition for Change of
Circumstances as a combined Petition to Modify.

(R.788 p. 8-9).

In this combined Petition to Modify, Appellant's arguments give
rise to the issues of violation of his constitutional right to
work, involuntary servitude, whether he is voluntarily
underemployed, and the imputation of income to him and the

11

disallowance of a change in circumstances.
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 is in
violation of the Utah Right to Work law, Utah State Constitution
and the U.S. Constitution.

In part, Appellant asserts that by

using his "historical and current earnings" to determine whether
he was voluntarily unemployed, the trial court violated his
constitutionally protected right to work in an occupation of his
choosing.

(Appellant's Brief at p. 10-11), See Utah Code Ann. §§

78-45-7.5(5)(c) , (7)(a), (7)(b); Utah Code Ann. § 34-34-2, -6.
There is nothing in either the U.S. Constitution or the Utah
Constitution which says that Appellant can avoid his child
support obligation.

Appellant has a right to work, however, he

also has a child support obligation for his and Ms. McGillivray's
five children.

If he chooses to voluntarily quit a job or

voluntarily work at a job with lesser pay, there is nothing
unconstitutional about a court requiring him to support his
children.

None of his constitutional or state statutory

citations are otherwise persuasive.

Therefore, the trial court

properly ruled that his constitutional arguments were unfounded.
Furthermore, the trial court correctly determined that
Appellant was intentionally underemployed for the purpose of
avoiding child support obligations and therefore subject to
imputation of income.

In computing gross income, "[historical

and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an
underemployment or overemployment situation exists."
Ann. § 78-45-7.5(5)(c) (Supp. 1994).
12

Utah Code

Based upon Appellant's

testimony concerning his educational training, work history and
the discrepancy between his past and his current earnings, the
trial court properly found Appellant to be voluntarily
underemployed.

(R.788 p. 34-50).

(R.725).

While Appellant

argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding
Appellant to be intentionally underemployed, no support exists in
the record for such an argument.
In finding the Appellant to be intentionally underemployed
for the purposes of avoiding child support payments, the trial
court has the statutory authority to impute income to Appellant.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a).

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-45-7.5(7)(b),
[i]f income is imputed to a parent, the
income shall be based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived
from work history, occupational
qualifications and prevailing earnings for
persons of similar backgrounds in the
community.
In applying these statutory factors to determine the amount of
income to be imputed to Appellant, the trial court properly found
Appellant to have an earning capacity of $2,000.00 per month.
(R.788 p. 34-50).

(R.725).

In the case of Hill v. Hill, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993), the court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in not making specific findings of fact that exhusband was underemployed since he had submitted at trial to
imputation of income and because his job history and current
employment options supported the imputation of an amount higher
13

than the ex-husband's current salary.

In the instant case,

Appellant did not submit to imputation of income, but his job
history and current employment situation supports the imputation
of income.
Additionally, the trial court was within it's discretion to
not consider Appellant's situation a material change in
circumstances for purposes of downward modification of his award.
Appellant did not demonstrate that

a material change in

circumstances had occurred since the divorce.
fact, his situation had improved.

As a matter of

At the time of the divorce, he

was earning $1,500.00 per month (R.343, R.788 p. 29, 48-49) and
the evidence at the hearing indicates he is capable of earning
$2,000.00 per month.

(R.788 p. 48-49).

In the case of Grover v.

Grover, 839 P.2d 871, 873 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the court held
that a child support order can only be modified based upon a
showing of a material change in circumstances.
As a basis for his argument that the trial court failed to
make specific and detailed findings, Appellant relies upon Ostler
v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
however, is misplaced.

His reliance,

In Ostler the court held that the failure

of the trial court to enter specific findings on each of the
statutory factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 for an
award of prospective support after a material change of
circumstances is generally reversible error.

.Id., at 715.

In the

instant case the trial court properly found no change in
circumstances to justify modification of the existing support
14

award, Ostler was based upon a modification of a prior award
after the determination that a material change of circumstances
had occurred.

Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715.

Appellant also makes an argument that he is entitled to
relief from retroactively accumulated support.

This argument is

without merit as a Petition to Modify applies to prospective
support.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(2), see Grover v. Grover, 839

P.2d at 873).
Appellant makes another argument that the trial court should
have granted his Petition to Modify due to his obligations to his
"current" family,

Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial

court erred in concluding that Appellant's obligation to support
his natural children of this action is primary to his obligation
to support his natural children of a subsequent common law
marriage.

(R.726).

However, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(5)

(Supp. 1994) provides:
[i]n a proceeding the modify the existing
award, consideration of natural or adopted
children other than those common to both
parties may be applied to mitigate an
increase in the award, but may not be applied
to justify a decrease in the award, (emphasis
added).
Again, Appellant's argument is not supported by statutory
authority.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED ON AND DENIED
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND ORDER.
Appellant argues that his due process rights were violated
because the trial court failed to rule on his Motion for Relief
15

from Judgment and Order.

This argument ignores the fact that the

trial court did issue a Judgment and Order in response to
Appellant's Motion on August 19, 1993.

(R.749-751).

The trial

court denied Appellant's request for court appointed counsel, for
a new trial, and for relief from judgment and order dated July
16, 1993.

(R.749-751).
POINT IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DOES NOT REVERSE A PRIOR 1991
ORDER.
Appellant argues that the trial court's order holding
Appellant in contempt for non-payment of child support overturns
the prior 1991 order in which Appellant was allowed to purge
himself.

The unpaid child support sought for the State in 1991

was instigated to recovery unpaid support prior to the dates set
forth in the instant case before the lower court.

(R.788 p. 21).

The previous judgment entered on April 29, ]991 does not in any
way conflict or overturn the instant judgment for unpaid support
for the period March 1991 through January 199 3.
POINT V.
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER HIM IS RES JUDICATA.
Appellant has continuously argued that the trial court does
not have jurisdiction over him.

This issue was litigated before

Judge Tibbs in the divorce action and thus is now res judicata.
Specifically, in the trial court's findings of fact concerning
Appellant's and Ms. McGillivray's divorce decree dated June 8,
1987, Judge Tibbs specifically found that the court has
16

jurisdiction over Appellant in this matter.

(R.330-331).

Furthermore, on January 5, 1989, Judge Tibbs concluded in a
ruling on a previous Order to Show Cause brought by the State
that the court retains jurisdiction over Appellant in this
matter.

(R.532).

Thus, in this case, res judicata bars

Appellant from contesting the court's jurisdiction as the issue
has been previously litigated and ruled upon.

See State v.

V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) holding that res
judicata bars defendant from claiming non-paternity because the
court had previously entered a decree of paternity.
POINT VI.
APPELLANT'S CONTEMPT WAS IN THE NATURE OF CIVIL
CONTEMPT AND HE THEREFORE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO COUNSEL
PRIOR TO INCARCERATION, HOWEVER, EVEN IF THIS COURT
FINDS THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO COUNSEL, THIS ISSUE IS
NOW MOOT.
Appellant contends that while knowing he was indigent, the
trial court both failed to inform him of his right to counsel and
further, refused to grant his request for the same.

(Appellant's

Brief at p. 4). Contempt of court is an amorphous contempt and
takes many forms and serves many purposes.

Within contempt law

there are two distinct forms of contempt - civil and criminal which serve two equally district purposes.

Further, within civil

and criminal contempt there are two further refinements - direct
or indirect - which greatly effect the contemner's due process
hearing rights.2
2

If the contempt is direct, it is committed in the presence of
the judge and may be punished summarily without the need for a
hearing. However, if the contempt is indirect, it is committed
17

Whether it be civil or criminal, in a contempt proceeding
the plaintiff must allege, that in contempt of court, the
defendant wilfully disobeyed an order of the court and must make
a prayer that the defendant be punished therefor.

In this sense,

it is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and
purpose that serves to distinguish between civil and criminal
contempt.

See Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range, 221 U.S. 418, 441

(1911); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Utah 1988); 3
Charles Wright, Federal Practice And Procedure § 704 (1982).

If

it is for civil contempt, the punishment of the court is remedial
and for the benefit of the complainant.

Gompers, 221 U.S. at

441; Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988); Von
Hake, 759 P.2d at 1168.

But, if it is for criminal contempt, the

sentence is punitive - to vindicate the court - and is limited to
imprisonment for a definite period of time.

Gompers at 441-442;

Von Hake at 1168.
Thus, imprisonment for civil contempt is ordered not to
vindicate the judge, but rather because the defendant refused to
outside the presence of the judge and due process requires that the
contemnor be given a hearing and be able to present witnesses in
its defense.
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1169-70. The due
process clause of the federal constitution requires that in a
prosecution for indirect contempt, "the person charged be advised
of the nature of the action against him, have assistance of
counsel, if requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and
have the right to offer testimony on his behalf."
Burgers v.
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982).
Thus, while civil nonsupport is surely indirect contempt in
which the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to have
counsel present, Burgers does not answer the question of whether
the State must appoint counsel if the defendant is unable to obtain
such on its own.
18

perform an affirmative act required by order of the court.
Imprisonment then is not inflicted as a punishment, but is
intended to be remedial and to coerce the defendant to do that
which the court has ordered.

Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441-442.

Moreover, the decree in such cases must provide the defendant
with a "purge" condition for its contemptuous behavior and must
hold that the defendant stand committed unless and until it
performs the affirmative act as required by the order of the
court.

See Feiock, 485 U.S. at 624.

In 1988, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Feiock approach
to differentiating civil and criminal contempt as a matter of
state law.

Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1168 n.5.

Thus, for all future

cases the Utah state courts:
will follow the rule that a contempt order is
criminal if the fine or sentence imposes is
fixed and unconditional, but is civil if the
fine or imprisonment is conditional such that
the contemnor can obtain relief from the
contempt order merely by doing some act as
ordered by the court. Further a contempt
order is civil if the order is to pay a fine
to the other party rather than to the court.
Id.

In the instant case, the contempt can be characterized as

civil only if the order was intended to be remedial in nature and
provided Appellant with the ability to purge himself.3
As a general rule, non-support contempt hearings are civil
in nature, however, if the contemnor is not presented with, or
3

While it is clear from the transcript that the contempt in
this case began as an indirect civil contempt - based upon
Appellant's failure to pay child support - it may be said that the
contempt was transformed into direct contempt based upon
Appellant's courtroom behavior.
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does not have the ability to meet, specified purge conditions,
the proceedings may become criminal and therefore subject to the
due process requirements of all other criminal proceedings,
Feiock at 632. As the significant and essential characteristic
of civil contempt is that the penalty can be avoided by
compliance with the court order, the ability to comply must exist
in substance as well as in form.
1220, 1222 (Haw. 1978).

Murray v. Murray, 597 P.2d

If, in fact, Appellant did not have the

ability to comply in substance with the order to the court, the
proceeding in the instant case was criminal in nature, and
pursuant to holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court, he likely was
entitled to court-appointed counsel.

See Arqersinqer v. Hamlin,

407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwriqht, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
In Gideon v. Wainwriqht, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, which is made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment, "any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided to him."

Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.

While in Gideon, this proclamation was made solely in the context
of state felony trials, the Court later refined its position in
Arqersinqer v. Hamlin, supra.

In Arqersinqer, the court was

faced with the question whether persons charged with only
misdemeanor or other petty offense equally enjoyed the right to
assistance of counsel set forth in Gideon.

In holding that such

right could not be limited to felony cases only the court found
that no accused may be deprived of his liberty without the aid of
20

counsel.

"[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person

may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel."
Arqersinqer, 407 U.S. at 37.
In civil non-support cases, "in order to justify a finding
of contempt and the imposition of a jail sentence, it must appear
by clear and convincing proof that:

(1) the party knew what was

required of him; (2) that he had the ability

to comply;

and (3)

that he wilfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so."
Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119.(Utah 1977) (emphasis added).
When a divorced father falls behind in his court-ordered support
payments, the court may summon the father to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt for his failure to pay.
cause is found, the court may order a jail term.

When no

Generally, in

such cases, the contempt is civil in nature and the jail term is
intended only to coerce the father to perform his failure to
perform.

See Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 766 (Alaska 1971).

Imperative in these proceedings, is the father's ability to
comply with the order of the court.
U.S. 56, 76 (1948).

E.g., Maqqio v. Zeitz, 333

The father must be presented with an

opportunity to purge his contempt at any time and therefore
secure his immediate release.

Johansen, 491 P.2d at 7 64;

Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442.
The fact that a contemnor - the father - may be faced with
the possibility of incarceration is often cited as the reason why
the accused must be given the right to have the assistance of
21

counsel.

See 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt § 201; Walker v. McLain, 768

F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1985).

Accordingly, it has been held that

the right to counsel must be extended to all contempt proceedings
- whether civil or criminal; petty or serious - as long as the
proceedings carry a risk of imprisonment as a possible penalty.
This rule has been applied where non-compliance with a child
support order may result in a jail or prison sentence.

However,

the right to counsel in these cases appear to be limited to
instances of indigence.

McLain, 768 F.2d at 1181.

According to this standard, a father may not be incarcerated
for failure to pay court-ordered child support unless the court
first determines that the contemnor has the present ability to
purge himself of the contempt.

In this sense, some courts have

held that there is never a right to court-appointed counsel in a
civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support
"because if the parent has the ability to pay, there is no
indigence, and if the parent is indigent, there is not threat of
imprisonment."

Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 1985)

(citing Andrews v. Walton, 428 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1983).
To determine that court-appointed counsel is never necessary
in civil contempt hearings, courts have relied upon the fact
that, in contrast to criminal contempt proceedings, civil
contempt is, by nature, remedial and coercive only.
objective is compliance, not punishment.
N.W.2d 88, 9 3 (Mich. 1976).

Its

Sword v. Sword, 249

While some cases may present special

circumstances in which counsel may be helpful, as a general rule,
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there is no constitutional mandate requiring the appointment of
the same...Sword, 249 N.W.2d at 93.

Such courts have held, in

most cases, civil non-support hearings are not complex.

Id.

While cases do vary and some situations may call for the
assistance of counsel, there is no general rule requiring such a
measure.

Id.

Thus, for these courts, although the defendant

does have a strong liberty interest in remaining free from bodily
restraint, this interest is not as strong as it would be if the
defendant were being criminally prosecuted or charged with a
crime.
Similarly, in a civil contempt action, courts have found
that the defendant has the power and ability to control its own
destiny.

Thus, courts have relied upon the fact that the

defendant is only in risk of losing its liberty if it is proven:
1) the defendant has the ability to comply with the court order;
and 2) that the defendant has filed to make the necessary
arrangements to do so.

State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v.

Rael, 642 P.2d 1099, 1102 (N.M. 1982).

Conversely, however,

other courts have found that where the defendant is indigent, it
is quite misleading to hold that civil contempt is somehow selfinflicted.

Therefore, some courts note that it is the State, and

not the indigent father, who holds the keys to the contemnor's
release.

Duval v. Duval, 322 A.2d 1, 3 (State 1974); In re

Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).

In such cases, it is

the State that places the contemnor in jail for failure to pay,
and it is the State that establishes the conditions for release.
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Duval, 322 A.2d at 3-

Thus, for an indigent father who lacks the

apparent ability to comply with the court's order, an order of
civil contempt is no less an application of State power than is
criminal confinement.
In Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1985), the
court found that an indigent father who was facing incarceration
in a civil non-support action was entitled to have courtappointed counsel.

McLain, at 1184.

In so ruling, the court

stated that "[i]t is the defendant's interest in personal
freedom, and not simply special sixth and fourteenth amendment
right to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to
appointed counsel."

Id. at 1183 (quoting Lassiter v. Department

of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, reh'g
453 U.S. 927 (1981)).

denied,

The court further stated that it would e

absurd to distinguish criminal from civil incarceration because,
from the perspective of the incarcerated individual, "the jail is
just as bleak no matter which label is used."

Id.

Moreover, the

court found that the line between civil and criminal contempt is
fine and rarely as clear as the State would suggest.

Thus, the

right to counsel, pursuant to the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, "turns not on whether a proceeding may be
characterized as 'criminal' or 'civil,' but on whether a
proceeding may result in a deprivation of liberty."

Id. (citing

Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413 (5th Cir. 1983)).
Pursuant to Matthews v. Eldridqe, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976),
the McLain court set forth the elements that must be evaluated to
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determine the need for court-appointed counsel.
include:

These elements

1) the private interest affected by state action; 2)

the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest without the
assistance of counsel; and 3) the government's interest - both
fiscal and administrative - in retaining the status quo.

Id.

The court found that in cases involving the possible
incarceration of an indigent defendant, the defendant's
interest - personal liberty - is one of the most important
interests protected by the Constitution.

However, where the

defendant's incarceration may be conditional upon compliance with
the purge condition, the court noted, that the interest personal
liberty is not absolute.

Id. at 1184.

Thus, as the defendant's interest in personal liberty
diminishes, so does its right to appointed counsel.

Id.

However, the court found, where the defendant is truly indigent where he has not ability to purge himself - his liberty interest
is no more conditional than a criminal defendant's.

That a truly

indigent defendant may ever be incarcerated for failing to comply
with its court-ordered support obligations, the court held,
highlights the very need for the assistance of counsel.
In such cases the assistance of counsel would greatly aid
the defendant:

1) in establishing its indigence; and 2) ensuring

that the defendant is not improperly incarcerated.

Id.

While

the State has a keen interest in assuring that children are
supported, the court found that this interest is in no way
superior to the interest in court-appointed counsel to assist the
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non-supporting parent to establish that its failure to pay was
not wilful/
Finally, the court held due process requires, at a minimum
"that an indigent defendant threatened with incarceration for
civil contempt for non-support, v/ho can establish indigence under
the normal standards for appointment of counsel in a criminal
case, be appointed counsel to assist him in his defense."
1185.

Id. at

See Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 267 (6th Cir. 1984)

(holding the relevant question is not whether the proceeding is
civil or criminal but whether the court intends to incarcerate the non-supporting defendant); Ridgway v. Baker, 740 F.2d 1409,
1413 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
for an indigent father in a civil non-support case); Nordgren v.
Mitchell, 716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting, by implication,
that there is a right to court-appointed counsel for indigent
civil non-support defendants); Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386,
1390 (9th Cir. 1973) (sating in dictum, that no indigent father
may be imprisoned unless represented by counsel).

Additionally,

the court cited to several other federal court decisions which
have uniformly established a right to court-appointed counsel in
other types of civil contempt proceedings.

U.S. v. Anderson, 583

D.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1977) (contempt for refusing to comply with a
grand jury summons); In re Pi Bella, 518 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1975)
A

Unlike those courts which have held that matters of civil
non-support are rudimentary and straightforward, the court in
McLain found that the issues in a non-support proceeding are seldom
straightforward and that counsel will be assistance in insuring the
accuracy and fairness of the proceeding. McLain at 1184.
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(grand jury summons); In re Kilqo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973)
(grand jury summons); In re Grand Jury Proceedings:

U.S. v. Sun

Kung Rang, 468 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1972) (grand jury summons).
In the instant case, the trial court specifically found that
this Appellant is capable of earning up to $2,000.00, so there
was no finding of indigency and clearly a finding of Appellant's
ability to pay.

(R.725).

The trial court also specifically

found that Appellant was underemployed for purposes of avoiding
his child support obligation.

(R.725).

Thus, the trial court's

determination that Appellant be held in contempt and immediately
begin his jail sentence without appointment of counsel is
supported by the record.

However, even if this court accepts

Appellant's arguments that he should have been appointed counsel
and/or allowed to purge himself the issue is now moot.

Appellant

is not making any claims for damages, resulting specifically from
the contempt order, and the contempt order is now complete, thus
there is nothing to be gained by Appellant through consideration
of this issue.

Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 28

(Utah Ct. App. 1994), See also Sanders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574,
577 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) which holds that a case is moot when the
requested relief cannot effect the rights of the litigants.
POINT VII.
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING FALSIFICATION OF COURT
RECORD AND RULE 11 SANCTIONS ARE TOTALLY WITHOUT MERIT
AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD OR AUTHORITY.
Appellant for the first time raises claims of falsification
of record and arguments regarding Rule 11 before this court in
his points 13 and 14. The arguments are blatantly unmeritorious.
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Appellant cites no authority for his positions or either cites
authority that is totally unrelated to facts in the record.
Therefore, such arguments should be summarily rejected by this
court.
CONCLUSION
The lower court properly addressed and dismissed all of the
claims set forth by Appellant regarding due process, violation of
the provisions of the U.S. Constitution, the Utah Constitution
and Utah law.

The lower court also properly specifically

outlined its findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon
the record and the law.

Thus, the August 19, 1994 order by the

court should be upheld and Appellant's appeal should be
dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this

£2-

day of August, 1994.
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RIGHT TO WORK LAW

34-34-4

34-34-2. Public policy.
Jt is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state of Utah that the
right of persons to work, whether in private employment or for the state, its
counties, cities, school districts, or other political subdivisions, shall not be
denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor
anion, labor organization or any other type of association; and further, that
the right to live includes the right to work. The exercise of the right to work
jimst be protected and maintained free from undue restraints and coercion.
?Hlfltory: C. 1953, 34-34-2, enacted by L.
909, ch. 85, § 144.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
tlur. 2d. — 48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and

C.J.S. — 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 22.
Key Numbers. — Labor Relations •=» 14.

Bbor Relations § 12.

SB-34-3. "Employer" defined.
pHe word "employer" as used in this chapter includes all persons, firms,
~ aciations, corporations, the state, its counties, cities, school districts and
er political subdivisions.
fcUiStO]>ry:

C. 1953, 34-34-3, enacted by L.
>, ch. 85, § 145.

HS-34-4. Agreement, understanding or practice denying
right to work declared illegal.
JKny express or implied agreement, understanding or practice between any
ioyer and any labor union, labor organization or any other type of associawhereby any person not a member of such union, organization or any
iher type of association shall be denied the right to work for an employer, or
^reby membership in such labor union, labor organization or any other
of association is made a condition of employment or continuation of
jployment by such employer, or whereby any such union, organization or
JQrother type of association acquires an employment monopoly in any enterjiie or industry, is hereby declared to be an illegal combination or conspiracy
[JjL'against public policy.
gfttory: C. 1953, 34-34-4, enacted by L.
ch. 85, § 146.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
iction and application.
•unty employees who are fired by a newly
Republican county commissioner on the
that they are members of the Demop party cannot contain reinstatement un£his section. Anderson v. Utah County, 13

Utah 2d 99. 368 P.2d 912 (1962).
The phrase "any other tvpe of association"
does not include political parties. Anderson v.
Utah County, 13 Utah 2d 99, 368 P 2d 912
(1962).
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34-34-5

LABOR IN GENERAL
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. JUT. 2d. — 48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and
Labor Relations § 12.

C.J.S. — 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 22.
Key Numbers. — Labor Relations «=» 44.

34-34-5. Any agreement, understanding or practice designed to violate chapter declared illegal.
Any express or implied agreement, understanding or practice which is designed to cause or require, or has the effect of causing or requiring, any
employer or labor union, labor organization or any other type of association,
whether or not a party thereto, to violate any provision of this chapter is
hereby declared an illegal agreement, understanding, or practice and contrary
to public policy.
History: C. 1953, 34-34-5, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 85, § 147.

34-34-6. Conduct forcing violation of act illegal — Peaceful and orderly solicitation excepted.
Any person, firm, association, corporation, labor union, labor organization
or any other type of association engaging in lockouts, layoffs, boycotts, picketing, work stoppages, or other conduct, a purpose of which is to compel or force
any other person, firm, association, corporation, labor union, labor organization or any other type of association to violate any provision of this chapter
shall be guilty of illegal conduct contrary to public policy; but nothing herein
contained shall be construed to prevent or make illegal the peaceful and
orderly solicitation and persuasion by members of a labor union, labor organization or any other type of association of others to join a labor union, labor
organization or any other type of association, unaccompanied by any intimidation, use of force, threat of use of force, reprisal, or threat of reprisal.
History: C. 1953, 34-34-6, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 85, § 148.

34-34-7. Compelling person to join or not join labor union
unlawful.
It shall be unlawful for any employer, person, firm, association, corporation,
employee, labor union, labor organization or any other type of association,
officer or agent of such, or member of same, to compel or force, or to attempt to
compel or force, any person to join or refrain from joining any labor union,
labor organization or any other type of association.
History: C. 1953, 34-34-7, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 85, § 149.
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62A-9-101
Section
62A-9-131.

HUMAN SERVICES CODE
Legal actions — Evidence —
Value of benefits.

Section
62A-9-134.

County attorney and attorney
general responsibilities.

62A-9-101. Legislative purpose.
It is the purpose of this chapter to provide assistance under appropriate
programs to any person in this state who is in need as defined by relevant
federal law, by this chapter, or by rules enacted by the department under this
chapter. A person is in need and entitled to assistance only if there are not
sufficient resources available for his use, within the limitations set forth in this
chapter, and if he otherwise qualifies. Applicants and recipients under this
chapter shall be encouraged and assisted to achieve economic independence
and self-sufficiency.
History: C. 1953,62A-9-101, enacted by L. ment, effective May 2, 1994, made a stylistic
1888, ch. 1, § 218; 1994, ch. 12, ft 76.
change.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

62A-9-104. Office — Creation — Powers and responsibilities.
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-262 provides
that the Office of Family Support is repealed
July 1, 1999.

62A-9-114. General assistance — Public Assistance.
(1) Aid to Families with Dependent Children may be provided to families
and children in accordance with Title IV-A of the Social Security Act and
applicable federal regulations.
(2) (a) General Assistance may be provided to individuals who are not
receiving direct jmoney grants as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or Supplemental Security Income, and who are unemployable
according to standards promulgated by the department.
(b) General Assistance may be provided by payment in cash or in kind
The office may, by rule, limit the grants that are made to General
Assistance recipients. Those limitations may be made infrequencyand
duration of payments, or by providing an amount less than the existing
payment level for an otherwise similarly situated recipient of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children.
(c) The office shall establish asset limitations for General Assistance
recipients, similar in kind to the limitations described in Section 62A-9117, but which may differ as to quantity, amount, or value.
(d) General Assistance may be granted to meet special nonrecurrent
needs of recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and to
applicants for the federal Supplemental Security Income program, if they
agree to reimburse the department for assistance advanced while awaiting the determination of eligibility by the Social Security Administration.
Other than for the optional state supplementation made under the Social
Security Act, no General Assistance payments may be made to current
recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children or Supplemental
Security Income.
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(e) Public assistance may include payment for the reasonable cost of
burial for recipients, if heirs or relatives are not financially able to assume
this expense, and the county is determined not to be liable for the expense
under Section 17-5-250. However, if the bodies of these persons are
unclaimed, Section 53B-17-301 is applicable thereto. The office shall fix
the costs of a reasonable burial and conditions under which burial
expenditures may be made.
(3) Assistance may be provided to persons in need who are transients. That
assistance may be designated under any of the foregoing public assistance
programs for which they would otherwise qualify.
£ (4) The office may cooperate with any governmental unit or agency, or any
private nonprofit agency in establishing work projects to provide employment
for employable persons.
History: C. 1953,62A-9-114, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 1, § 231; 1988, ch. 242, § 22; 1994,
Bh.147, § 98.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

ment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Section 17-5-250w for "Section 17-5-67* in Subsection(2Xe).

62A-9-121. Assignment of support.
(1) (a) The department shall obtain an assignment of support from each
applicant or recipient regardless of whether the payment is court ordered.
(b) Any right to support from any other person that has accrued at the
time the assignment is executed or, if none is executed, at the time of
application for assistance, passes to the department upon the receipt of
assistance, even if the recipient has not executed and delivered an
assignment to the department.
(c) The right to support described in Subsection (b) includes a right to
support in the applicant's or recipient's own behalf or in behalf of any
family member for whom the applicant or recipient is applying for or
receiving assistance.
(2) An assignment of support or a passing of rights by operation of law
includes payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged by any court within this
state, any other state, or territory of the United States and is not in lieu of, and
shall not supersede or alter, any other court order, decree, or judgment.
(3) When an assignment is executed or the right to support passes to the
department by operation of law, the applicant or recipient is entitled to regular
monthly assistance and the support paid the department is a refund.
(4) All sums refunded, except any amount which is required to be credited
to the federal government, shall be retained by the department for use in the
administration of this section and for other authorized activities. Under this
section authorized activity includes, but is not limited to, the use of refunded
sums to obtain legal services where deemed necessary by the department, to
enforce this section, Title 78, Chapters 45 and 45a, as well as any other
statutes designated by the department.
History: C. 1953,62A-9-121, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 1, § 238; 1989, ch. 22, § 40; 1994,
ch. 140, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsec-

tion (1) to clarify the provision as to the right to
support; inserted "or the right to support
passes to the department by operation of law"
in Subsection (3); and made stylistic changes.
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ftftA-11-104.1. Disclosure of information regarding employees.
liT Upon request by the office, for purposes of an official investigation made
^connection with its duties under Section 62A-11-104, the following disclosures shall be made to the office:
(a) a public or private employer shall disclose an employee's name,
address, date of birth, income, social security number, and health insurance information pertaining to the employee and his dependents;
(b) an insurance organization subject to Title 31A, Insurance Code, or
the insurance administrators of a self-insured employer shall disclose
health insurance information pertaining to an insured or an insured's
dependents, if known; and
(c) a financial institution subject to Title 7, Financial Institutions Act of
1981, shall disclose financial record information of a customer named in
the request.
£2)~The office shall specify by rule the type of health insurance and financial
_ Drd information required to be disclosed under this section.
~(S) All information received under this section is subject to Title 63, Chapter
^.Government Records Access and Management Act.
£4) An employer, financial institution, or insurance organization, or its
it or employee, is not civilly or criminally liable for providing information
Fto the office in accordance with this section, whether the information is
*E$&vided pursuant to oral or written request.
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-104.1, enacted
I*y L. 1994, ch. 140, § 2.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 140

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

62A-11-106. Office may file as real party in interest —
Written consent to payment agreements —
Money judgment in favor of obligee considered
to be in favor of office to extent of right to
recover.
(1) The office may file judicial proceedings as a real party in interest to
establish, modify, and enforce a support order in the name of the state, any
department of the state, the office, or an obligee.
J2) No agreement between an obligee and an obligor as to past, present, or
future obligations, reduces or terminates the right of the office to recover from
that obligor on behalf of the department for public assistance provided, unless
the department has consented to the agreement in writing.
(3) Any court order that includes a money judgment for support to be paid
to an obligee by any person is considered to be in favor of the office to the extent
of the amount of the office's right to recover public assistance from the
judgment debtor.
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-106, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 1,1 269; 1989, ch. 62, § 3; 1994,
ch; 140, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendBient, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "as to

past, present, or future obligations* for "either
relieving an obligation or purporting to settle
past, present, or future obligations, either as
settlement or prepayment* in Subsection (2)
and made a stylistic change in Subsection (1).
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PART 3
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
62A-11-301. Short title.
This part shall be known as the "Public Support of Children Act."
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-301, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 1, § 286.
Cross-References. — Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, § 78-45-1 et seq.

Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq.

62 A-11-302. Common-law
and
statutory
augmented — Public policy.

remedies

The state of Utah, exercising its police and sovereign power, declares that
the common-law and statutory remedies pertaining to family desertion and
nonsupport of minor dependent children shall be augmented by this part,
which is directed to the real and personal property resources of the responsible
parents. In order to render resources more immediately available to meet the
needs of minor children, it is the legislative intent that the remedies provided
in this part are in addition to, and not in lieu of, existing law. It is declared to
be the public policy of this state that this part be liberally construed and
administered to the end that children shall be maintained from the resources
of responsible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in part, the
burden often borne by the general citizenry through public assistance programs.
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-302, enacted by
L. 1988, ch. 1, § 287.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Family
Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 270.

62A-11-303. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an action or proceeding of the
office conducted in accordance with Section 63-46b-l.
(2) "Administrative order" means an order that involves payment or
collection of support that has been issued by the office, the department, or
an administrative agency of another state or other comparable jurisdiction with similar authority to that of the office.
(3) "Assistance" or "public assistance" means assistance for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, public funds expended for the reasonable and necessary health and dental care of a dependent child, and public resources used for the benefit of a person, whether specified as financial aid, services, or otherwise.
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PART 3
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
62A-11-304.2. Issuance and modification of administrative order — Compliance with court order —
Authority of office — Stipulated agreements —
Interest — Notification requirements.
(1) Through an adjudicative proceeding the office may issue or modify an
administrative order, based on the criteria outlined in Section 62A-11-304.3,
that:
(a) determines whether an obligor owes support;
(b) requires an obligor to pay a specific or determinable amount of
present and future support;
(c) determines the amount of past due support; and
(d) renews an administrative judgment. The office shall commence an
adjudicative proceeding to renew a judgment by serving notice of agency
action on the obligor before the judgment is barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.
(2) If a court order has been issued, the office may not issue an order under
Subsection (1) that is not based on the court order.
(3) The office may proceed under this section in the name of tha state, any
department of the state, the office, or the obligee.
(4) The office may accept voluntary acknowledgment of a support obligation
and enter into stipulated agreements providing for the issuance of an administrative order under this part.
(5) The office may act in the name of the obligee in endorsing and cashing
any drafts, checks, money orders, or other negotiable instruments received by
the office for support.
(6) The office may assess interest not to exceed 1% per month on any unpaid
support if notice of the assessment of interest has been provided to the obligor
in a notice of agency action.
(7) The obligor shall, after a notice of agency action has been served on him
under this part, keep the office informed of:
(a) his current address;
(b) the name and address of current payors of income;
(c) availability of or access to health insurance coverage; and
(d) applicable health insurance policy information.
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-304.2, enacted
by L. 1989, ch. 62, § 10; 1994, ch. 140, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, deleted provisions
in Subsection (2) setting forth conditions required for issuance by the office of an order

under Subsection (1) that is not based on a
court order and rewrote Subsection (7), which
read "The obligor shall notify the office of any
change of address or employment that occurs
after a notice of agency action has been properly served on him under this part*

62A-11-304.3. Administrative order — Basis.
(1) If a court order does not exist, the office shall base its administrative
order on support guidelines established in accordance with the Family Support
Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. Section 1305 et seq.
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(2) All funds appropriated or collected for publishing the divisions publications shall be nonlapsing.
History: C. 1953,63-46a-10, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 158, § 1; 1987, ch. 241, § 10; 1991,
ch. 177, § 3; 1992, ch. 146, § 2; 1993, ch. 282,
§ 9; 1994, ch. 24, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, deleted former

Subsection (l)(e), which read: "publish court
rules and proposals for court rules as denned in
Section 36-20-1 when they are made available
to members of the bar and the public for public
comment," and redesignated the subsequent
subsections accordingly

CHAPTER 46b
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
Section
63-46b-l.

63-46b-l.

Section
63-46b-15.

Scope and applicability of chapter.

Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings.

Scope and applicability of chapter.

(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by
a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this
chapter, the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and
govern:
(a) all state agency actions that determine' the legal rights, duties,
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable
persons, including all agency actions to grant, deny, revoke, suspend,
modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right, or license; and
(b) judicial review of these actions.
(2) This chapter does not govern:
(a) the procedures for making agency rules, or the judicial review of
those procedures or rules;
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in the payment of a tax, the
decision to waive penalties or interest on taxes, the imposition of and
penalties or interest on taxes, or the issuance of any tax assessment,
except that this chapter governs any agency action commenced by a
taxpayer or by another person authorized by law to contest the validity or
correctness of those actions;
(c) state agency actions relating to extradition, to the granting of
pardons or parole, commutations or terminations of sentences, or to the
rescission, termination, or revocation of parole or probation, to actions and
decisions of the Psychiatric Security Review Board relating to discharge,
conditional release, or retention of persons under its jurisdiction, to the
discipline of, resolution of grievances of, supervision of, confinement of, or
the treatment of inmates or residents of any correctional facility, the Utah
State Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center, or persons in the
custody or jurisdiction of the Division of Mental Health, or persons on
probation or parole, or judicial review of those actions;
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline, employ, transfer, reassign, or promote students or teachers in any school or educational
institution, or judicial review of those actions;
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(e) applications for employment and internal personnel actions within
an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those
actions:
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment under Title 35, Chapter 9,
Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah
Construction Trades Licensing Act, except that this chapter governs any
agency action commenced by the employer, licensee, or other person
authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of the citation or
assessment;
(g) state agency actions relating to management of state funds, the
management and disposal of school and institutional trust land assets,
except that this chapter governs any agency's final action commenced by
any person pursuant to Section 65A-1-7, and contracts for the purchase or
sale of products, real property, supplies, goods, or services by or for the
state, or by or for an agency of the state, except as provided in those
contracts, or judicial review of those actions;
(h) state agency actions under Title 7, Chapter 1, Article 3, Powers and
Duties of Commissioner of Financial Institutions; and Title 7, Chapter 2,
Possession of Depository Institution by Commissioner; Title 7, Chapter 19,
Acquisition of Failing Depository Institutions or Holding Companies; and
Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, or judicial review
of those actions;
(i) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for unemployment benefits, the initial determination of any person's eligibility for
benefits under Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation, and Title 35,
Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act, or the initial determination of
a person's unemployment tax liability;
(j) state agency actions relating to the distribution or award of monetary grants to or between governmental units, or for research, development, or the arts, or judicial review of those actions;
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or order under Title 26,
Chapter 8, Utah Emergency Medical Services System Act; Title 19,
Chapter 2, Air Conservation Act; Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe Drinking Water
Act; Title 19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act; Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 1,
Solid and Hazardous Waste Act; Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 4, Underground
Storage Tank Act; or Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 7, Used Oil Management
Act, except that this chapter governs any agency action commenced by any
person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of the notice
or order;
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required by federal statute or
regulation to be conducted according to federal procedures;
(m) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for government
or public assistance benefits;
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and
certificates of registration;
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facilities; and
(p) state agency actions under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records
Access and Management Act, except as provided in Section 63-2-603.
(3) This chapter does not affect any legal remedies otherwise available to:
(a) compel an agency to take action; or
(b) challenge an agency's rule.
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(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an
adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative proceeding from:
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with parties and interested
persons to:
(1) encourage settlement;
(ii) clarify the issues;
(hi) simplify the evidence:
(iv) facilitate discovery; or
(v) expedite the proceedings; or
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent that the
requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter.
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are not
governed by this chapter, except as explicitly provided in that section.(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings authorized by Section
63-46b-21 are governed by this chapter.
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting rules affecting
or governing adjudicative proceedings or from following any of those rules, if
the rules are enacted according to the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the
requirements of this chapter.
(7) (a) If the attorney general issues a written determination that any
provision of this chapter would result in the denial of funds or services to
an agency of the state from the federal government, the applicability of
those provisions to that agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary
to prevent the denial.
(b) The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature
at its next session.
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an independent
basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action.
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a presiding officer,
for good cause shown, from lengthening or shortening any time period
prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial
review
History: C. 1963, 63-46b-l, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 257; 1988, ch. 72, § 15; 1990,
ch. 306, § 2; 1991, ch. 207, § 39; 1991, ch.
212, § 5; 1991, ch. 259, § 51; 1992, ch. 30,
§ 128; 1992, ch. 280, § 57; 1992, ch. 303,
§ 12; 1993, ch. 91, § 1; 1994, ch. 40, § 4; 1994,
ch. 200, § 86; 1994, ch. 297, § 13.
Amendment Notes. - T h e 1994 amendI T ; blrtl °A e f f e C t l V e * ? a £ 2 , 1 9 9 4 ; *$"?'
n?t n
Occupational Disease Act for
Utah Occupational Disability LaV in Subsec£ ™ * J ^
? ^ ± ^
Conservation Act" for 'Title 19, Chapter 5
Water Quality Act" and 'Title 19, Chapter 5,
Water Quality Act" for "Title 19, Chapter 2, Air
Conservation Act, or" and inserted "or Title 19,
Chapter 6, Part 7, Used Oil Management Act"

in Subsection (2)(k); and made stylistic and
punctuation changes throughout the section,
The 1994 amendment by ch. 200, effective
June 1,1994, deleted "Title 7, Chapter 8a, Utah
Industrial Loan Corporation Guaranty Act,"
n e a r t n e middle of Subsection (2Xh) and made
s t y l i f l t l c changes.
T h e 1 9 9 4 a m e n d m e n t by ch. 297, effective
July 1. 1994, made stylistic and punctuation
ch
m S u b s e c t l o n s (2)(f)> (h)> (i)f ^
(k)
^
^ 6 P a r t 4>
and ^
UQT M
19 c h
Underground Storage Tank Act" in Subsectum
v(2)(k).
^ . 18 8 tlon l s s e t
„
. , . ,.
T* fT
°^ a s r*conaled by the
0ffice of
Legislative Research and General
c
o\mael

60

78-2a-3

JUDICIAL CODE

tion, because jurisdiction attached under the
statute in effect when the petition for review
was filed. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n
v Board of State Lands, 869 P2d 909 (Utah
1993).

Certiorari.
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction
granted by this section, the Supreme Court
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals,
not of the trial court: therefore, the bnefs of the
parties should address the decision of the Court
of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court.
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 R2d 97 (Utah 1992).

—Formal adjudicative proceedings.
Subdivision (3)(e)(m) confers jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court only over final orders and
decrees that originate in formal adjudicative
proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands &
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992).

Cited in State v. Humphrey, 823 R2d 464
(Utah 1991).

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-3.

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
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AXJR. — Sexual partner's tort liability to
other partner for fraudulent misrepresentation
regardmg stenlity or use of birth control resulting in pregnancy, 2 A L R 5th 301

Parent's child support liability as affected by
other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation regardmg stenlity or use of birth control, or
refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 A.L.R,5th 337.

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior
court order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on
the part of the obligor or obligee.
(b) If the pnor court order contains a stipulated provision for the
automatic adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support
shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a showing of a material
change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision:
(i) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child
support award required by the guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's
voluntary reduction of income.
(2) If no pnor court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall
require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing
award may be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court
shall establish support after considenng all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(f) the ages of the parties; and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of
others.
(4) When no pnor court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this
chapter.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7; 1977, ch.
145, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2; 1989, ch. 214, § 3;
1990, ch. 100, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 2; 1994,
ch. 140, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendmentbych 140, effective May 2, 1994. substituted "the Uniform Child Support Guidelines
descnbed in this chapter" for "but not limited
to: (a) the amount of public assistance received
by the obligee, if any; and (b) the funds that

have been reasonably and necessarily expended in support of spouse and children" at
the end of Subsection (4).
The 1994 amendment by ch. 118, effective
July 1, 1994, designated former Subsection (1)
as Subsection (l)(a) and added Subsection
(1Kb).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

fication of support.
^Application of guidelines.
s
3ivorce decree.
•bdification of support.
Application of guidelines.
trial court committed reversible error
it failed to apply the presumptive guideset forth in this chapter and determined
support outside -Ihe guidelines without
there were special circumstances that
d deviation. Hill v. Hill, 841 R2d 722
Ct. App. 1992).

—Divorce decree.
Plaintiff was required to file a petition to
modify her divorce decree under Rule 6-404 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration when
she sought to enforce, by order to show cause, a
provision in the decree that provided that future child support would be automatically adjusted to reflect changes in income. Such a
provision violates Subsection (1) of this section,
which provides that a child support order can
only be modified based upon a showing of a
material change in circumstances. Grover v.
Grover, 839 P.2d 871 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Cited in Baker v. Baker, 226 Utah Adv. Rep.
27 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

18-45-7.1. Medical expenses of dependent children — Assigning responsibility for payment — Insurance
coverage — Income withholding.
The court shall include the following in its order:
(1) a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable
and necessary medical expenses for the dependent children;
(2) a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate
insurance for the medical expenses of dependent children, if coverage is or
becomes available at a reasonable cost;
(3) provisions for income withholding, in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(4) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Parts 4 and 5.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L.
1984, ch. 13, § 3; 1990, ch. 166, § 3; 1993, ch.
261, § 12; 1994, ch. 118, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective January 1, 1994, rewrote the
undesignated introductory paragraph, which
read "When no prior court order exists or the
prior court order makes no specific provision for
the payment of medical and dental expenses for

dependent children, the court in its order9;
made several stylistic changes in Subsections
(1) and (2); and added Subsections (3) and (4).
The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994,
deleted "and dentar after "medical" in Subsection (1) and deleted "health, hospital, and dental care" after "appropriate" and inserted "medical expenses" in Subsection (2).

78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing
or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or
permanent child support.
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(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the
application of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with
these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the
provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the
conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an
award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to
rebut the presumption in that case.
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of
that parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the
option of either party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting
or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (5).
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the respective parents for the additional children. The obligations
shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before
determining the award in the instant case.
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or
adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be applied
to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied to justify a
decrease in the award.
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment of the guidelines and any
subsequent change in the guidelines constitutes a substantial or material
change of circumstances as a ground for modification or adjustment of a court
order, if there is a difference of at least 25% between the existing order and the
guidelines. In cases enforced under IV-D of Title IV of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., the office may request modification, in accordance with the requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988, Public Law
100-485, no more often than once every three years.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, ch. 100, § 3; 1990,
ch. 275, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "and the
use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines" in Subsection (2)(b); m Subsection (6),
inserted "or adjustment" in the first sentence
and substituted "In cases enforced under IV-D

of Title IV of the Social Secunty Act, 42 U.S.C.
Section 601 et seq." for "With regard to IV-D
cases" at the beginning of the second sentence;
and made stylistic changes,
Federal Law. — The Family Support Act of
1988, Public Law 100-485, cited in Subsection
(6), amended various sections throughout Title
IV of the Social Secunty Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et
seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Modification of award.
The trial court committed reversible error
when it failed to apply the presumptive guidelines set forth in this chapter and determined

child support outside the guidelines without
finding there were special circumstancea that
justified deviation. Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

78-45-7,3. Procedure — Documentation — Stipulation.
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving party shall submit:
(a) a completed ( ild support worksheet;
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
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(c) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of child
support requested is consistent with the guidelines.
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not
available, a verified representation of the defaulting party's income by the
moving party, based on the best evidence available, may be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only be offered after
a copy has been provided to the defaulting party in accordance with Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in an administrative proceeding.
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving parties shall submit:
(i) a completed child support worksheet;
(ii) the.financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5);
and
(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of
child support requested is consistent with the guidelines.
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall be used to review
the adequacy of a child support order negotiated by the parents.
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined child support and
alimony is adequate under the guidelines if the stipulated child support
amount or combined amount equals or exceeds the base child support
award required by the guidelines.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.3, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 5; 1990, ch. 100, § 4; 1994,
ch. 118, 8 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, in Subsection
(3Xc), substituted "equals or exceeds the base"

for "exceeds the total" and deleted the former
second sentence which read "When the stipulated amount exceeds the guideline*, it may be
awarded without a finding under Section 78-457 2."

78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used.
Acftusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of the
base combined child support obligation. Only income of the natural or adoptive
parents of the child may be used to determine the award under these
guidelines.
History: C. 1953, 78-46-7.4, enacted by JL
1989, ch. 214, § 6; 1994, ch. 118, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "base
combined childn support obligation" for "child
support award

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including noneamed sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, pnzes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
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(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training
Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance;
and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly
income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax
returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history,
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to
establish basic job skills; or
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(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994,
ch. 118, § 7.

Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendmem, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection
(5)(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
_.
Findings by court.
mC me
C^ted
° *
1

Findings by court.
Although a tnal court entered findings required by Subsection 7(b), since the tnal court
failed to enter any findings required under
Subsection (7)(a), the findings on the whole
were insufficient. Hall v Hall, 858 P.2d 1018
(Utah Ct App 1993)
Imputed income.
Even though the court's findings of fact did

not include a specific finding that ex-husband
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced
^ t h e ^ ^ ^ o f m c o m e a t the ^
level
and because his job history and current employment options inarguably supported this imputation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income m an amount greater
than the ex-husband's current salary. Hill v.
Hill, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah C t App.
1993).
„
««-««„
Cited in Cummings v. Cummmgs, 821 P.2d
472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

78-45-7.7. Calculation of .obligations.
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be divided between them in
proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, unless the low income table is
applicable.
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in
Section 78-45-2 and in cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is
$1,050 or less monthly, the base child support award shall be determined as
follows:
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child
support obligation table.
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined
child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income.
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is
between $650 and $1,050, the base child support award shall be the lesser of
the amount calculated in accordance with Subsection (2) and the amount
calculated using the low income table.
(4) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined
child support obligations for up to six children. For more than six children,
additional amounts may be added to the base child support obligation shown.
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Unless rebutted by Subsection 78-45-7.2(3), the amount ordered shall not be
less than the amount which would be ordered for up to six children.
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is $649 or less, the
court or administrative agency shall determine the amount of the child support
obligation on a case-by-case basis, but the base child support award shall not
be less than $20.
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support amount for the total
number of children, not an amount per child.
History: C. 1953, 78-46-7.7, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 9; 1990, ch. 100, § 6; 1994,
ch. 118, 5 8.
Amendment Notes. — Tile 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, added "unless the
low income table is applicable" at the end of
Subsection (1); inserted "and in cases where the
obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less
monthiy and substituted "base" for "total" in
the introductory language of Subsection (2);
inserted "combmed" the second time the word
appears m Subsection (2Xa); deleted "and subtractmg from the products the children's por-

tion of any monthly payments made directly by
each parent for medical and dental insurance
premiums" at the end of Subsection (2Xb); deleted former Subsections (2)(c) and (2Xd) relatmg to the calculation of the child support
award; added present Subsections (3) and (5)
and redesignated the subsections accordingly;
m present Subsection (4), substituted "six children» for « t e n chiidren" in two places, suhttituted "may" for "shall" in the second sentence
a n d a d d e d t h e ^ d sentence; and made ityust l c changes,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Watson v Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calculations.
In cases of split custody, the base child support award shall be determined as
follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child
support obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calculated amount
between the parents in proportion to the number of children for whom
each parent has physical custody. The amounts so calculated are a
tentative base child support obligation due each parent from the other
parent for support of the child or children for whom each parent has
physical custody.
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support obligation due each parent
by the percentage that the other parent's adjusted gross income bears to
the total combined adjusted gross income of both parents.
(3) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection (2) from the larger amount
to determine the base child support award to be paid by the parent with
the greater financial obligation.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.8, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 10; 1990, ch. 100, § 7; 1994,
ch. 118, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "base"
for "total" in the introductory language; inserted "combined" the second time the word
appears in the first sentence of Subsection (1);

deleted former Subsection (3) relating to subtraction of payments for medical and dental
insurance premiums; redesignated former Subsection (4) as Subsection (3); deleted former
Subsections (5) and (6) relating to allocation of
combmed monthly work related child care costs
and calculation of the total child support
award; and made stylistic changes.
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78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation calculations.
In cases of joint physical custody, the base child support award shall be
determined as follows.
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child
support obligation table.
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined
child support obligation by multiplying the base combined child support
obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income.
The amounts so calculated are a tentative base child support obligation
due from each parent for support of the children.
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child support obligation by the
percentage of time the children spend with the other parent to determine
each parent's tentative obligation to the other parent.
(4) Calculate the base child support award to be paid by the obligor by
subtracting the lesser amount calculated in Subsection (3)fromthe larger
amount.
(5) The parent determined to be the obligor in Subsection (4) shall pay
the amount calculated in Subsection (4) when the obligee has physical
custody.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.9, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 11; 1990, ch. 100, § 8; 1994,
ch. 118, § 10.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "base"
for "total" in the introductory language; inserted "combined" the second time the word
appears in Subsection (1), inserted "base" the
second time the word appears in the first sentence of Subsection (2), deleted former Subsection (4) relating to subtraction of payments

made for medical and dental insurance premiurns; redesignated former Subsection (5) as
Subsection (4), deleted former Subsection (6)
relating to allocation of the combined work
related child care cost of the parents; redesignated former Subsection (7) as Subsection (5)
and rewrote the provision; deleted former Subsection (8) which read "Include the amounts
determined in Subsections (7Xa) and (b) and
the two total child support awards in the child
support order"; and made stylistic changes.

78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18.
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated from high school
during the child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs
later, the base child support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower
base combined child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining
number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child
support order.
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount derived from the
base child support award originally ordered.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.10, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 12; 1994, ch. 118, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or has

graduated from high school during the child's
normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later" and deleted "combined" before "child support award" in Subsection (1).
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78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation.
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child support award
be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during which the child is with
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a
recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the
parties for reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be
approved by the administrative agency. However, normal visitation and
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of
the consecutive day requirement.
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement
applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by the
number of children included in the award.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.11, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 13; 1990, ch. 100, § 9; 1994,
ch. 118, § 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, in Subsection (1),
substituted the language beginning "which the
child is" for "which the order grants specific
extended visitation for that child for at least 25

of any 30 consecutive days" at the end of the
first sentence and substituted the second and
third sentences for "Only the base child support
award ia affected by the 50% abatement The
amount to be paid for work related child care
costs may be suspended if the costa are not
incurred during the extended visitation."

78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables.
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level specified in
the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be ordered on a
case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the highest
level specified in the table for the number of children due support.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.12, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214,1 14; 1994, ch. 118, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "shall"
for "may" and inserted "on a case-by-case basis."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Baker v. Baker, 226 Utah Adv. Rep.
27 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and functions.
(1) On or before March 1, 1995, and every fourth year subsequently, the
governor shall appoint an advisory committee consisting of:
(a) two representatives recommended by the Office of Recovery Services;
(b) two representatives recommended by the Judicial Council;
(c) two representatives recommended by the Utah State Bar Association; and
(d) an uneven number of additional persons, not to exceed five, who
represent diverse interests related to child support issues, as the governor
may consider appropriate. However, none of the individuals appointed
under this subsection may be members of the Utah State Bar Association.
182

UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT

78-45-7.14

(2) (a) The advisory committee shall review the child support guidelines to
ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate child
support award amounts.
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interim
Committee on or before October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before
October 1 of every fourth year subsequently.
(c) The committee's report shall include recommendations of the majority of the committee, as well as specific recommendations of individual
members of the committee.
(3) The committee members serve without compensation. Staff for the
committee shall be provided from the existing budgets of the Department of
Human Services and the Judicial Council. The committee ceases to exist no
later than the date the subsequent committee under this section is appointed.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.13, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, i 15; 1990, ch. 183, § 58; 1994,
ch* 118, § 14.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted

"March 1, 1995" for "May 1, 1989 and May 1,
1991" and deleted "then on or before May 1 o r
before "every fourth year" in the introductory
language of Subsection (1).

78-45-7.14. Base combined child support obligation table
and low income table.
The following includes the Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table
and the Low Income Table:
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TABLE
(Both Parents)
Monthly Combined
Adj. Gross Income
1
From
650
676
701
726
751
776
801
826
851
876
901
926
951
976
1,001
1,051
1,101

Number of Children
3
4

2

5

-

6

lb
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

675
700
725
750
775
800
825
850
875
900
925
950
975
1,000
1,050
1,100
1,150

99
103
106
110
113
117
121
124
128
132
135
139
143
146
154
161
168

184
190
197
204
211
218
224
231
238
245
251
258
265
272
285
299
313
183

191
198
205
212
219
226
243
253
263
274
284
294
305
315
335
356
377

198
205
212
220
227
234
261
275
289
303
316
330
344
358
385
413
441

200
207
214
221
229
236
263
277
291
305
319
333
347
361
389
417
444

201
209
216
223
231
238
265
279
294
308
322
336
350
364
393
421
449
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Monthly Combined
Adj. Gross Income
From

1

2

176
183
190
198
205
212

326
340
353
367
381
394
408
421
435
449
462
476
489
503
517
530
544
571
592
608
625
641
658
674
691
707
724
740
756
773
789
804
817
830
843
856
870
883
896
909
923
936
949
962
975

Number of Chil(
3
4

5

6

454
475
496
516
537
558
579
600
620
641
662
683
704
723
736
750
752
779
807
835
862
882
909
937
964
992

460
484
508
532
556
580
605
629
653
677
701
725
749
771
786
800
813
833
862
891
921
942
972

lb

1,151 — 1,200
1,201 — 1,250
1,251 — 1,300
1,301 — 1,350
1,351 — 1,400
1,401 — 1,450
1,451 — 1,500
1,501 — 1,550
1,551 — 1,600
1,601 — 1,650
1,651 — 1,700
1,701 — 1,750
1,751 — 1,800
1,801 — 1,850
1,851 — 1,900
1,901 — 1,950
1,951 — 2,000
2,001 — 2,100
2,101 — 2,200
2,201 — 2,300
2,301 — 2,400
2,401 — 2,500
2,501 — 2,600
2,601 — 2,700
2,701 — 2,800
2,801 — 2,900
2,901 — 3,000
3,001 — 3,100
3,101 — 3,200
3,201 — 3,300
3,301 — 3,400
3,401 — 3,500
3,501 — 3,600
3,601 — 3,700
3,701 — 3,800
3,801 — 3,900
3,901 — 4,000
4,001 — 4,100
4,101 — 4,200
4,201 — 4,300
4,301 — 4,400
4,401 — 4,500
4,501 — 4,600
4,601 — 4,700
4,701 — 4,800

2-20

227
234
242
249
256
264
271
278
286
293
308
319
328
336
345
354
362
371
380
388
397
406
414
423
431
438
444
451
458
465
472
479
486
493
499
506
513
520

387
403
418
433
448
463
478
493
509
524
539
554
569
584
597
610
622
643
666
687
708
725
746
767
788
809
830
851
872
893
914
934
953
973
992
1,012
1,031
1,050
1,069
1,088
1,107
1,131
1,150
1,169
1,188

449
465
482
499
515
532
549
565
582
599
615
632
649
664
677
690
700
716
741
766
791
809
834
859
885
910
936
962
987
1,013
1,039
1,064
1,090
1,116
1,141
1,167
1,192
1,217
1,242
1,267
1,292
1,326
1,350
1,375
1,400

1,020
1,048
1,076
1,103
1,131
1,159
1,187
1,215
1,243
1,270
1,297
1,325
1,352
1,379
1,407
1,443
1,470
1,498
1,525

1,001
1,031
1,060
1,090
1,120
1,149
1,179
1,208
1,238
1,268
1,297
1,327
1,356
1,386
1,415
1,444
1,474
1,503
1,541
1,570
1,600
1,629
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Monthly Combined
Adj. Gross Income
From

1

2

527
534
541
547
554
561
568
575
582
586
591
596
601
605
610
615
620
624
629
629
673
680
687
694
701
706
710
715
719
723
728
732
737
741
746
750
755
759
763
768
772
777
781
786
790

989
1,002
1,015
1,028
1,042
1,055
1,068
1,081
1,093
1,103
1,112
1,122
1,131
1,141
1,150
1,159
1,169
1,178
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,188
1,189
1,197
1,205
1,213
1,220
1,228
1,236
1,244
1,252
1,259
1,267
1,275
1,283
1,291
1,298
1,306
1,314
1,322
1,330
1,337

Number of Chile
3
4

78-45-7.14

5

6

To

4,801 — 4,900
4,901 — 5,000
5,001 — 5,100
5,101 — 5,200
5,201 — 5,300
5,301 — 5,400
5,401 — 5,500
5,501 — 5,600
5,601 — 5,700
5,701 — 5,800
5,801 — 5,900
5,901 — 6,000
6,001 — 6,100
6,101 — 6,200
6,201 — 6,300
6,301 — 6,400
6,401 — 6,500
6,501 — 6,600
6,601 — 6,700
6,701 — 6,800
6,801 — 6,900
6,901 — 7,000
7,001 — 7,100
7,101 — 7,200
7,201 — 7,300
7,301 — 7,400
7,401 — 7,500
7,501 — 7,600
7,601 — 7,700
7,701 — 7,800
7,801 — 7,900
7,901 — 8,000
8,001 — 8,100
8,101 — 8,200
8,201 — 8,300
8,301 — 8,400
8,401 — 8,500
8,501 — 8,600
8,601 — 8,700
8,701 — 8,800
8,801 — 8,900
8,901 — 9,000
9,001 — 9,100
9,101 — 9,200
9,201 — 9,300

1,207
1,226
1,245
1,264
1,282
1,300
1,317
1,335
1,351
1,367
1,383
1,398
1,414
1,430
1,445
1,461
1,480
1,495
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,511
1,520
1,531
1,541
1,551
1,562
1,572
1,582
1,592
1,603
1,613
1,623
1,633
1,644
1,654
1,664
1,675
1,685
1,695
1,705
1,716
1,726

1,425
1,450
1,475
1,500
1,522
1,544
1,566
1,588
1,610
1,632
1,653
1,675
1,697
1,719
1,740
1,762
1,791
1,812
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,834
1,841
1,853
1,864
1,876
1,887
1,899
1,911
1,922
1,934
1,945
1,957
1,969

1,552
1,580
1,607
1,634
1,658
1,682
1,706."
1,730
1,754
1,778
1,802
1,826
1,850
1,874
1,897
1,921
1,951
1,975
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
1,998
2,000
2,013
2,026
2,039
2,052
2,064
2,077
2,090
2,103
2,116
2,129
2,141
2,154
2,167

1,658
1,687
1,717
1,746
1,772
1,797
1,823
1,848
1,874
1,899
1,925
1,950
1,976
2,001
2,026
2,052
2,084
2,109
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,134
2,137
2,150
2,164
2,178
2,192
2,206
2,220
2,234
2,247
2,261
2,275
2,289
2,303
2,317
2,330
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78-45-7.14
Monthly Combined
Adj. Gross Income
1
From

To

9,301
9,401
9,501
9,601
9,701
9,801
9,901
10,001

— 9,400
— 9,500
— 9,600
— 9,700
— 9,800
— 9,900
— 10,000
— 10,100

795
799
803
808
812
817
821
826

2

Number of Children
3
4

1,345
1,353
1,361
1,369
1,376
1,384
1,392
1,400

1,736
1,747
1,757
1,767
1,777
1,788
1,798
1,808

1,980
1,992
2,003
2,015
2,027
2,038
2,050
2,061

5

6

2,180
2,193
2,206
2,218
2,231
2,244
2,257
2,270

2,344
2,358
2,372
2,386
2,400
2,414
2,427
2,441

5

6

24
47
71
94
118
141
165
188
212
235
259
282
306
329
376

24
48
71
95
119
143
166
190
214
238
261
285
309
333
380

LOW INCOME TABLE
(Obligor Parent Only)
Monthly Adj.
Gross Income
1
From

To

650
676
701
726
751
776
801
826
851
876
901
926
951
976
1,001

—
675
—
700
—
725
—
750
—
775
—
800
—
825
—
850
—
875
—
900
—
925
— 950
—
975
— 1,000
— 1,050

23
45
68
90
113

Number of Children
3
4

2

23
46
68
91
114
137
159
182
205
228
250

History: C. 1963,78-45-7.14, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 118, § 15.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1994, ch. 118, § 15 repeals former § 78-45-

23
46
69
92
115
138
161
184
207
230
253
276
299

23
47
70
93
116
140
163
186
209
233
256
279
302
326
372

7 14, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch. 100,
§ 10, containing the "Base Combined Child
Support Obligation Table," and enacts the
present section, effective July 1, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Baker v. Baker, 226 Utah Adv. Rep.
27 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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78-45-7.15. Medical expenses.
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the
minor children be provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost.
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for
medical expenses, the court or administrative agency may consider the:
(a) reasonableness of the cost;
(b) availability of a group insurance policy;
(c) coverage of the policy; and
(d) preference of the custodial parent.
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket
costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of
insurance.
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the
premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be
calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered
under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the
instant case.
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments,
incurred for the dependent children and actually paid by the parents.
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial
enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of
each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section
601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30
calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known of the change.
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days
of payment.
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent
fails to comply with Subsections (6) and (7).
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.15, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 118, § 16.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1994, ch. 118, § 16 repeals former § 78-45-

7 15, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch. 100,
§ ll f relating to medical expenses, and enacts
the present section, effective July 1, 1994.

78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred.
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent share equally the
reasonable work-related child care expenses of the parents.
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin
paying his share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of
proof of the child care expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be
incurred, that parent may suspend making monthly payment of that
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of
the child support order.
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ft)) (i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, a parent who
incurs child care expense shall provide written verification of the cost
and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial
engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other
parent.
(ii) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, the parent shall
notify the other parent of any change of child care provider or the
monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of
the change.
(3) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent
incurring child care expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the
expenses or to recover *the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent
incurring the expenses fails to comply with Subsection (2)(b).
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.16, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 18; 1990, cb. 100, § 12; 1994,
ch. 118, § 17.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, rewrote this section which read "(1) The monthly amount to be
paid for reasonable work related child care
costs actually incurred on behalf of the depen-

dent children of the parents shall be specified
as a separate monthly amount in the order,
"(2) If an actual expense included in an
amount specified in the order ceases to be
incurred, the obligor may suspend, making
monthly payment of that expense while it is not
being incurred, without obtaining a modification of the child support order."

78-45-7.17. Child care costs.
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child support order is
presumed, if the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent, during extended
visitation, is working and actually incurring the child care costs.
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may be awarded
on a case-by-case basis, if the costs are related to the career or occupational
training of the custodial parent, or if otherwise ordered by the court in the
interest of justice.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.17, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 19; 1994, ch. 118, § 18.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or the
noncustodial parent, during extended visita-

tion" in Subsection (1); added "or if otherwise
ordered by the court in the interest ofjustice* at
the end of Subsection (2); and made stylistic
changes,

78-45-7.18. Limitation on amount of support ordered.
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child support award that may be
ordered using the base combined child support obligation table, using the low
income table, or awarding medical expenses except under Subsection (2).
(2) If amounts under either table as provided in Section 78-45-7.14 in
combination with the award of medical expenses exceeds 50% of the obligor's
adjusted gross income, or by adding the child care costs, total child support
would exceed 50% of the obligor's adjusted gross income, the presumption
under Section 78-45-7.17 is rebutted.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.18, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 20; 1990, ch. 100, § 13; 1994,
ch. 118, § 19.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "using

the low income table, or awarding" for ttor for
the award of uninsured" in Subsection (1); substituted "If amounts under either table as provided in Section 78-45-7.14 in combination with
the award of medical expenses" for "If the
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combination of the two amounts under Subsection (1)" at the beginning of Subsection (2); and
made stylistic changes.

78-45-7.19. Determination of parental liability.
(1) The district court or administrative agency may issue an order determining the amount of a parent's liability for medical expenses of a dependent
child when the parent:
(a) is required by a prior court or administrative order to:
(i) share those expenses with the other parent of the dependent
child; or ^
(ii) obtain insurance for medical expenses but fails to do so; or
(b) receives direct payment from an insurer under insurance coverage
obtained after the prior court or administrative order was issued.
(2) If the prior court or administrative order does not specify what proportions of the expenses are to be shared, the district court may determine the
amount of liability as may be reasonable and necessary.
(3) This section applies to an order without regard to when it was issued.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.19, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 166, § 4; 1994, ch. 118, § 20.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or administrative agency" and substituted "medical
expenses" for "uninsured medical, hospital, and

dental expenses" in the introductory language
of Subsection (1); substituted "insurance for
medical expenses" for "medical, hospital, or
dental care insurance'' in Subsection (D(aXii);
and made a stylistic change,

78-45-7.20. Accountability of support provided to benefit
child — Accounting.
(1) The court or administrative agency which issues the initial or modified
order for child support may, upon the petition of the obligor, order prospectively
the obligee to furnish an accounting of amounts provided for the child's benefit
to the obligor, including an accounting or receipts.
(2) The court or administrative agency may prescribe the frequency and the
form of the accounting which shall include receipts and an accounting.
(3) The obligor may petition for the accounting only if current on all child
support that has been ordered.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.20, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 118, § 21.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 118, § 23
makes the act effective on July 1, 1994.

78-45-7.21. Award of tax exemption for dependent children.
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to
claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax
purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or
administrative agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a
case-by-case basis.
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall
consider:
189
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(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the
cost of raising the child; and
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may
not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not
current m his child support obligation, in which case the court or administrative agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent.
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will
result in a tax benefit to that parent.
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.21, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 118, § 22.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 118,5 23
makes the act effective on July 1, 1994.

78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support.
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor, and
the office may proceed pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable
statute, either on behalf of the Department of Human Services or any
other department or agency of this state that provides public assistance,
as defined by Subsection 62A-11-303C3), to enforce the right to recover
public assistance, or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right
of support against the obligor.
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the office to enforce
payment of the obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of the
attorney general or the county attorney of the county of residence of the
obligee to represent the office.
(2) (a) A person may not commence an action, file a pleading, or submit a
written stipulation to the court, without complying with Subsection (2)(b),
if the purpose or effect of the action, pleading, or stipulation is to:
(i) establish paternity;
(ii) establish or modify a support obligation;
(iii) change the court-ordered manner of payment of support; or
(iv) recover support due or owing.
(b) When taking an action described in Subsection (2)(a), a person must
file an affidavit with the court at the time the action is commenced, the
pleading is filed, or the stipulation submitted stating whether public
assistance has been or is being provided on behalf of a child who is a
subject of the action, pleading, or stipulation. If public assistance has been
or is being provided, the person shall mail a copy of the affidavit and a copy
of the pleading or stipulation to the office.
(c) If public assistance has been or is being provided, that person shall
join the office as a party to the action or mail or deliver a written request
to the office asking it to join as a party to the action. A copy of that request,
along with proof of service, shall be filed with the court. The office shall be
represented as provided in Subsection (l)(b).
(3) Neither the attorney general nor the county attorney represents or has
an attorney-client relationship with the obligee or the obligor in carrying out
the duties arising under this chapter.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 9; 1975, ch. 96,
§ 23; 1977, ch. 145, 8 11; 1982, ch. 63, § 2;

1989, ch. 62, § 23; 1990, ch. 183, § 59; 1994,
ch. 140, § 15.

UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsection (2)(a) which read "A person may not commence any action or file a pleading to establish
or modify a support obligation or to recover
support due or owing, whether under this chapter or any other applicable statute, without
filing an affidavit with the court at the time the
action is commenced or the pleading is filed
stating whether public assistance has been or is
bemg provided on behalf of a dependent child of
the person commencing the action or filing the

78-45a-5

pleading'', added the designation for Subsection
(2Kb) and the second sentence in the subsection; redesignated former Subsection (2XW as
Subsection (2)(c) ana added the language beginning "or mail or deliver" at the end of the
first sentence and inserted the second sentence
therein; deleted former Subsection (3) which
r e a d "As used m this section 'office' means the
Office of Recoverv Services within the Departraent
o f Human Services"; and added Subsect l o n (3)

CHAPTER 45a
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY
Section
78-46a-2.
78-45a-5.

Determination of paternity —
Effect — Enforcement.
Remedies.

Section
78-45a~7
78-45a-10
78-45a-10 5

Authority for genetic testing.
Effect of genetic test results.
Visitation rights of father.

78-45a-2. Determination of paternity — Effect — Enforcement.
(1) Paternity may be determined upon:
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public
authority chargeable by law with the support of the child; or
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in accordance with
Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act.
(2) If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to
the laws of this state or any other state, the liabilities of the father may be
enforced in the same or other proceedings by:
(a) the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or may
furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education,
necessary support, or funeral expenses; and
(b) other persons including private agencies to the extent that they
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch.
245, § 23; 1994, ch. 127, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, designated the
first sentence as Subsection (1), addmg Subsec-

78-45a-5.

tion (1Kb), and designated the second sentence
as Subsection (2), making related stylistic
changes and inserting "or any other state" in
the introductory language,

Remedies.

(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All
remedies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for
legitimate children shall apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies
under Title 77, Chapter 31, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
are available for enforcement of duties of support under this act.
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(4) advise the obligee of the available methods for service of process;
and
(5) assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a hearing before the
court.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-9.2, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 119, § 1.
Meaning of "this a c t " — The term "this
act," in the introductory language, means
Laws 1983, ch. 119, which enacted this section.

Cross-References. — Creation of Judicial
Council, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 12;
§ 78-3-21.
General duties of county attorney, i 17-18-1.
Service of process, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P.

78-45-10. Appeals.
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments under this act as in other
civil actions.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 10.
Meaning of "this act" — See note under
same catchline following § 78-45-1.

Cross-References. — Appeals generally,
Rules 3 to 13, U.R.A.P.

78-45-11. Husband and wife privileged communication inapplicable — Competency of spouses.
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of communications between husband and wife are inapplicable under this act. Spouses are competent witnesses to testify to any relevant matter, including marriage and parentage.
History: L- 1957, ch. 110, § 1 1 .
Meaning of "this act." — See note under
9ame catchline following § 78-45-1.
Cross-References. — Marital privilege in

civil actions generally, § 78-24-8; Rule 502,
U.R.E.
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, marital privilege inapplicable to, § 77-31-22.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses
§ 148 et seq.

C.J.S. — 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 266 et seq.
Key Numbers. — Witnesses ** 187 et seq.

78-45-12. Rights are in addition to those presently existing.
The rights herein created are in addition to and not in substitution to any
other rights.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 12.
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JAN GRAHAM #1231
Attorney General
PAUL F. GRAF #1229
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
201 East 500 North
Richfield, UT 84701
(801) 896-6142
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY

O J—

STATE OF UTAH

UJ UJ
LUQ

LU Q

LAURA BETH BARKER, and the STATE
OF UTAH, Department of Human
Services,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

J— I —

ZZ

vs.

<D CD CxJ

C i v i l No. 9085

MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER,
Defendant.

Judge Louis G. Tervort

THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER having come on before the court for
trial on the 30th day of June, 1993, on the State's Order to Show
Cause, and the State being represented by Paul F. Graf, Assistant
Attorney General, and the Plaintiff being present and not being
and

a

«2

UJ UJ

Plaintiff,

represented,

vr>

the Defendant

being

present

and

not

being

represented*; and the matters before the court being the Statefs
Order To Show Cause, the State's Order in Supplemental Proceedings,
and the Defendant's various pleadings, being treated by the court

LAURA BETH BARKER & STATE :>F UTAH v.
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Civil No. 9085

as a Petition to Modify; and witness having been called, namely,
Roleen Olsen, Investigator for the Office of Recovery Services;
Laura Beth Barker [McGillivary], Co-Plaintiff, and Michael Robert
Barker, Defendant, and arguments being presented by the Defendant,
Michael Robert Barker, and Paul F. Graf, Attorney for Co-Plaintiff,
State of Utah, and the matter being submitted to the court based
upon the evidence presented, and the court, having considered the
matter, now enters the following:

JUDGMENT
1.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the State of Utah

and against Defendant for unpaid child support arrears in the sum
of $13,050.00 for the period from March 1, 1991, through January
31, 1993.
2.

Defendant is adjudged in contempt of court for failure to

make the child support payments for the period from March 1, 1991,
through January 31, 199 3, as ordered.

ORDER
3.

Defendant shall serve 30 days in the Sanpete County jail

as penalty for his judgment of contempt, said 30 days began
2
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immediately at the time of the hearing on the 30th day of June,
1993, Defendant having been remanded to the custody of the sheriff
by oral order of the court at the conclusion of the trial.
4.

All other prior orders and nudgments in this matter shall

remain in full force and effect.
DATEQ^ejlT^53Jg^day of July, 1993^

rt Judge

^A^GE^t^kcXCE

OF DELIVERY AND MAILING

Tlir iiT^i^^jJj^iiiVn i 1 certifies to the court that a copy of
the foregoing Judgment and Order, mailed to the Michael Barker, c/o
Sanpete County Jail, 160 North Mam, Manti, UT 84642, on the 9th
day of July, 199 3; and, on the same date, a copy was also mailed to
Laura Beth Barker McGillivary, at her last known address.
Note: The original of said Order will be submitted to the
Court for signing 10 days after the last mentioned date, pursuant
to the agreement of the parties at trial.
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JAN GRAHAM #12 31
Attorney General
PAUL F. GRAF #1229
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
201 East 500 North
Richfield, UT 84701
(801) 896-6142
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LAURA BETH BARKER, and the STATE
OF UTAH, Department of Human
Services,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No, 9085

MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER,
Defendant.

Judge Louis G. Tervort

THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER having come on before the court for
trial on the 16th day of July, 1993, on the Defendant's Motion for
Court Appointed Counsel and the Defendant's Motion for New Trial
and Relief From Judgment or Order, and the State being represented
by Paul F. Graf, Assistant Attorney General, and the Plaintiff
being present and not being represented, and the Defendant being
present and not being represented; and the matters before the court
being the Defendant's Motion for Court Appointed Counsel and the

.AURA BETH BARKER & ^TATE MICHAEL RC3ERT BARKER
JUDGMENT AN": CRDER
C.vil No. 9365

-TAH v.

Defendant's Motion for New Trial and Relief from Judgment or Order,
and arguments being presented by the Defendant, Michael Robert
Barker, and Paul F. Graf, Attorney for Co-Plaintiff, State of Utah,
and the matter being submitted to the court based upon the evidence
presented, and the court, having considered the matter, now makes
the following:
ORDER
1. Defendant's request for court appointed counsel is hereby
denied.
2.

Defendant's request for a new trial is hereby denied.

3.

Defendant's request for relief from the judgment and

order is hereby denied.
4.

The Defendant is remanded to the Sanpete County Jail to

serve the remainder of his 30 day sentence.
5. All other prior orders and judgments in this matter shall
remain in full force aC^d effect.
DATED this

w

/" "

/ v ± Bay of August, 19/3

^AURA BETH BARKER & STATS I? UTAH v.
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
C.vil No. 9065

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY AMD MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies to the court that a copy of
the foregoing Judgment and Order, mailed to the Michael Barker, Box
142, Santa Clara, UT, on the f?O
day of August, 1993; and, on
the same date, a copy was also mailed to Laura Beth Barker
McGillivary, at her last known address
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